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FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, by Arthur Ripstein'
SIMON KUPI
ALTHOUGH IMMANUEL KANT'S THEORIES of ethics and metaphysics cast a long
and defined shadow over the history of philosophy, his ideas in the realm of law
and politics have had a more ambiguous influence. Many scholars, most famously
John Rawls, have applied Kant's ethical concepts-particularly the "categorical
imperative" of his Critique ofPractical Reason 2-in the furtherance of their own
political and legal ideas. Few, however, have afforded diligent attention to "Kant's
own questions,"' as Arthur Ripstein observes in Force and Freedom. Instead, con-
temporary thinkers have viewed with scepticism the significance of the concepts
of "public and private right,"' developed in his lesser-read foray into political and
legal philosophy, the Doctrine of Right. As Ripstein notes, Kant's legal and po-
litical theory, much to the dissatisfaction of many of his readers, belies a simple
extension of his categorical imperative. Moreover, Kant takes a position largely
unfashionable to the modern academy-denying that justice requires "a fair
distribution of benefits and burdens"' and instead proceeding from more classi-
cally-liberal notions of non-coercion. Front and centre for Kant is the "innate right
of humanity":' what Ripstein describes as a person's right to be "free.to use his or
her powers, individually or cooperatively, to set his or her own purposes,"' with
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no one-including the state-having a right to force him or her to advance or
accommodate the purposes of another.
Kant's prescription of "equal freedom" 8 -which, for the philosopher, con-
strains all legal rights individuals and governments may possess-no doubt rests
uneasily with the trappings and philosophical underpinnings of the modern wel-
fare state. But Ripstein, as a professor cross-appointed to the Law and Philoso-
phy departments of the University of Toronto, is well-equipped to provide an
updated exposition and defence of Kant's legal and political ideas against their
modern critics. In chapters three through five, the author re-examines Kant's
views on private right, including the philosopher's extension of innate right to
the common-law categories of property and contract. In chapters seven through
eleven, Ripstein surveys Kant's parallel theory of public right, governing the re-
lationship between the constraint of equal freedom and state power under a
constitutional order.
The book is particularly noteworthy for its substantive legal content, ani-
mated by Ripstein's research interests in tort, contract, and criminal law theory.
Ripstein draws into Kant's framework numerous tidbits of case-law and legal
history to frame the Doctrine ofRight's continued relevance to modern societies,
applying Kant's theory to explain concepts as varied as the volenti non fit injuria
principle, the criminal law's presumption of innocence, and the holding in Ron-
carelli v. Duplessis.' It will thus be of great interest to law scholars and students
whose interests or research projects intersect with legal theory. In elucidating
the unifying concepts behind Kant's views on government, as well as squaring
them against the views of Kant's modern intellectual rivals, the book is also a
welcome contribution to the political theory literature on Kant. Ripstein's ex-
position is clear and well-reasoned, providing a lively and faithful defence of
Kant's ideas that is as accessible as it is deep and comprehensive. However much
Kant's legal and political philosophy has suffered neglect or misunderstanding
at the hands of the academy, Force and Freedom recasts it anew-revitalizing an
essential work of an intellectual giant in a manner sure to provide fodder for
scholarly debate.
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